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ANTITRUST LAWS IN NATIONAL EMERGENCY:::
SAMUEL K. ABRAMS**
N A PERIOD of mobilization, antitrust litigation for the maintenance
of our competitive economy becomes increasingly important.
When priorities, allocations, price controls and other regulatory
measures must be adopted in order to insure the fair and effective
distribution of goods in short supply, opportunities for non-com-
petitive practices multiply. Some manufacturers may be tempted
to resort to tying clauses, full-line forcing, exclusive dealer
arrangements, and other practices which may be detrimental to
free competition.
To keep the channels of diszribution open and to secure the maxi-
mum output of the economy for defense, it is essential that illegal
practices be punished by prompt and vigorous enforcement of the
antitrust laws.
The Antitrust Division must be alert to continue to take appro-
priate steps to eliminate illegal competitive practices which con-
tribute to the advance of industrial concentration in the economy.
In addition to discharging these traditional functions, the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice has been increasingly
active since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea with new respon-
sibilities which stem directly from the mobilization program., These
additional duties arise from provisions of the Defense Production
Act of 1950, as amended,2 and from directives of the President
which charge the Attorney General with specific responsibilities
*The substance of this paper was presented to the Round Table on Trade
Regulations, of Association of American Law Schools at Denver, Colorado,
Dec. 29, 1951. Mr. Abrams spoke as the representative of H. Graham Morison,
Assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge of the Antitrust
Division.
**Chief of the Legislation and Clearance Section, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice. Mr. Abrams acknowledges his indebtedness to Edward
T. Whitehead and Kenneth R. Harkins, attorneys on the staff of the Anti-
trust Division, for their assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1. A valuable analysis of the effect of the mobilization program on that
portion of the national policy expressed in the antitrust laws has been made
by the Subcommittee on Study of Mfonopoly Power of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives in its report, The Mobilization
Program, H.R. Rep. 1217, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
2. 50 U. S. C. App. § 2601 et. seq. (1946) ; Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (July 31, 1951) ; Pub. L. No. 139, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 602 (Sept.
1, 1951).
3. White House Press Release, Sept. 28, 1950. See also the President's
memorandum, dated Dec. 20, 1950, transmitting to the defense agencies the
first report of the Att'y General.
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directed at safeguarding the American free economic system in the
course of defense mobilization. 4
The nature of the responsibility of the Antitrust Division in the
present mobilization program is set forth in Section 2 of the De-
fense Production Act, as follows:
".... It is the intention of the Congress that the President shall
use the powers conferred by this Act to promote the national
defense, by meeting, promptly and effectively, the requirements
of military programs in support of our national security and
foreign policy objectives, and by preventing undue strains and
dislocations upon wages, prices, and production or distribution
of materials for civilian use, within the framework, as far as
practicable, of the American system of competitive enterprise."
This statement of policy on the part of Congress was given prac-
tical effect by the President in a memorandum dated September 28,
1950, addressed to all defense agencies, in which he directed that
such agencies should consult with the Attorney General and the
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission for the purpose of
determining and, to the extent consistent with the principal ob-
jectives of the Defense Production Act and without impairing the
defense effort, of eliminating any factors which may tend to sup-
press competition unduly, create or strengthen monopoly, injure
small business or otherwise promote undue concentration of eco-
nomic power.
The consultations which arise out of these expressions on the part
of the President and the Congress constitute a major defense activity
of the Antitrust Division. In addition, this Division represents the
Attorney General in consultations preparatory to the consideration
of proposed voluntary agreements under §§ 708(a) (b) and (c) of
the Act, it conducts surveys, or requests the Federal Trade Com-
mission to do so, and prepares the reports to the Congress and to
the President under § 708 (e), and it takes an active part in guiding
the manner of operation of business advisory committees provided
for by § 701 (b) (ii) of the Act.
Consultation with Mobilization Agencies
The importance of the function of the Antitrust Division in the
current emergency is, in many respects, greater than during an all-
out war in which there is total mobilization of our resources for
defense. When the nation is at war, our entire production engine
4. Except for certain litigation functions, these responsibilities of the
Att'y General have been assigned to the Antitrust Division of the Dep't of
Justice. Dep't of Justice Order No. 3732, Supp. No. 48, Oct. 5, 1950.
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moves in a single direction, the nature and extent of our arms
requirements become clear and the part which each segment of the
economy is to play comes into focus.
In a period of partial mobilization of indeterminate extent in
time, such as that in which we are now engaged, the problem is an
entirely different one. We seek now to lay the groundwork for ex-
pandible productivity and to broaden the base of our production so
that, in the event of a sudden outbreak of global war, we may imme-
diately bring forth a torrent of end military items. Our aim is to
blueprint total war from the standpoint of production and yet to
produce only that quantity of goods necessary to meet the current
needs of our armed forces.
The mobilization in which we are now engaged is one which is
expected, at its peak, to take approximately 20 per cent of the na-
tion's output of goods and services." Without question, the coun-
try's resources can support a mobilization program of that magni-
tude. It must be recognized, however, that the impact of military
production will affect specific industries and individual producers
in varying degrees. It is erronecus to assume that the defense share
will be a 20 per cent one across all industry and that such a percent-
age will have only a mild effect upon our competitive economy. In
many industries, the defense "cut" will be a great deal deeper than
20 per cent, and, within an industry itself, the share may well
vary among those in different phases of production.6
In this period of limited mobilization, therefore, our Govern-
ment has found it necessary to institute price and wage controls,
to establish priorities and allocations, to encourage the expansion
of basic industries through certificates of tax amortization, loans
and purchase commitments, and to engage in other activities directly
related to the emergency.7 The Antitrust Division has the greatest
concern that each of these activities should be carried on in a man-
ner which will promote competition and not monopoly and restraints
upon our commerce.
Periods of widespread Government controls and of heavy mili-
tary purchases contain the seeds of concentration of economic
5. Director of Defense Mobilization, Building America's Might 3 (Re-
port to the President, April 1, 1951).
6. Third Report of the Att'y General of the United States pursuant to§ 708(e) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 11.
7. Priorities and allocations are authorized by Title I of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, as amended, see note 2 supra, expansion of pro-
ductive capacity and supply by Title III, and price and wage stabilization
by Title IV. Certificates of tax amortization are issued pursuant to Int. Rev.
Code § 124A (1950).
[Vrol. 36:490
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power. It was knowledge of this fact which impelled the Congress
and the President to insist that mobilization should be so conducted
as to preserve competition to the greatest extent possible. The
lessons of the past are clear that, unless we utilize every possible
safeguard, the consequences of mobilization will be the impairment
of the vigor of our competitive system and the loss of small busi-
ness enterprises which make up the solid core of our economy. It
is in this context that the Antitrust Division conducts its consulta-
tions with the mobilization agencies.
To illustrate the nature of the consultations, the Antitrust Divi-
sion has, on a number of occasions, reviewed with the Office of
Price Stabilization the contents of pricing regulations. The fact
that pricing techniques are an important source of antitrust viola-
tions need not be labored. The problem, however, becomes aggra-
vated when a Government regulation becomes the vehicle for the
introduction of such practices into an industry. The approach of
the Antitrust Division to the matter becomes clearer by making
reference to an extract from a letter, written June 5, 1951, by this
Division to Mr. DiSalle, Director of the Office of Price Stabiliza-
tion:
"We are especially anxious that, in the formulation of ceiling
prices for particular industries, you do not adopt pricing tech-
niques which will serve either to encourage groups within an
industry to combine for the purpose of fixing prices or to rigidify
the future price structure of an industry in such manner as to
discourage competitive pricing. We are fully aware of the ad-
ministrative problems with which you are confronted in establish-
ing price ceilings, both from the standpoint of their formulation
and their enforcement. However, we feel that your regulations
will reflect the purpose of the Act to preserve our system of free
enterprise if thorough consideration and study are given to the
alternatives available to you in the preparation of each regula-
tion.
"Thus, we have noted that in certain cases ceiling prices are
to be determined by reference to privately published guides, such
as 'Blue Book,' 'Red Book,' 'Official Used Car Guides' or
other manuals. GCPR. Supp. Reg. 5, as amended. We have pre-
viously discussed with you our objections to the use of the
'manufacturer's suggested list prices,' which appeared in the
same regulation. In the same connection, your representatives
have discussed with us their plans to issue regulations which will
establish retail or wholesale ceiling prices by reference to manu-
facturers' or distributors' catalogues.
"We consider that all of such practices constitute positive
deterrents to competition and that they create opportunities for
1952]
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conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade. Investiga-
tions conducted by us in the past and those which we now have
under way made it plain that such pricing techniques are devices
frequently used for the violation of the antitrust laws. We would
consider it particularly unfortunate if such pricing techniques
are given the blessing of a governmental administrative body."
In the same manner, the Division has consulted with representa-
tives of the National Production Authority and of Defense Produc-
tion Administration with reference to allocations and priorities, and
the grant of certificates of tax amortization. The manner in which allo-
cations and priorities are issued may be the decisive factor in deter-
mining whether thousands of small businesses shall be preserved as
constituent units of our competitive economy. By the same token,
the grant of tax amortization certificates may be extremely signifi-
cant in advancing or halting the trend toward concentration of
industry.
An interesting example of this work of the Antitrust Division
is found in its activities in connection with the aluminum expansion
program which is now being sponsored by the Government.
The Department of Justice is interested in the aluminum expan-
sion program both by reason of its responsibility to encourage com-
petition in the course of mobilization and by reason of the continuing
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in the antitrust suit, United States v. Aluni-
num Company of America.8 In its decision in the Alcoa case in 1950,
the trial court held that competitive conditions had not been estab-
lished and did not in fact exist in the aluminum industry. The
court retained jurisdiction for five years to enable the Government
to seek further and more complete relief."
Inasmuch as there are only three producers of primary aluimi-
num, Alcoa, Reynolds Metals Company and Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation, this industry is one of the most highly con-
centrated of all our critically important defense industries. The
policy of the Antitrust Division is to encourage the expansion of the
primary aluminum industry by the introduction into it of new inde-
pendent producers.
The urgent necessity that new independent competitors should
enter the aluminum industry is also evidenced by the need for an
insured source of supply of primary aluminum for the nation's
non-integrated fabricators of aluminum products. At the outbreak
8. 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
9. Id. at 418.
[Vol. 36:490
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of hostilities in Korea, there were approximately 17,000 non-
integrated manufacturers of aluminum articles, most of them rela-
tively small businesses.' 0 Since Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser together
own approximately 85 per cent of the capacity to fabricate pig
aluminum, it is imperative that other sources of supply must be
established if we are to preserve the fabricating capacity of these
small manufacturers, who, in World Var II and in the present
emergency, have demonstrated that they possess useful facilities and
skills, of great diversity, to supply both defense and civilian needs.
In the course of discharging its responsibilities in this field,
representatives of the Antitrust Division have been in frequent con-
sultation since October, 1950, with mobilization officials in charge
of the aluminum expansion program." The Division's recommenda-
tions concerning the nature which the expansion of the aluminum
industry should take have not to this time been adopted by the
mobilization agencies. The function of the Division in regard to
this and other similar programs, however, is solely, a consultative
one, and the ultimate decision concerning the allocation of capacity
rests with those agencies charged with responsibility for our na-
tional defense and our defense production.
In addition to those agencies already mentioned, the Antitrust
Division has been in frequent consultation with the Petroleum Ad-
ministration for Defense, Office of Defense Mobilization, Defense
Transport Administration, Federal Reserve System, General Serv-
ices Administration, Munitions Board and the Departments of
Defense, Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce. As new agencies,
such as the Defense Materials Procurement Agency and the Small
10. Aluminum, H. R. Rep. No. 255, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1951).
11. A letter, dated August 2, 1951, from the Att'y General to the Sec-
retary of the Interior, is illustrative of the nature of'these consultations. After
pointing out that 174,000 tons of aluminum production capacity remained to
be allocated, the Att'y General in this letter stated:
"It is my belief that you should proceed with negotiations to work
out contracts for this 174,000 tons of aluminum capacity with new alumi-
num producers rather than with Alcoa, Reynolds or Kaiser, the three
concerns which presently constitute the entire industry. In the event that
new producers can be introduced into the industry only by contracting
with them on the basis of a price differential exceeding that established
by the contracts with the three existing producers, I consider that, in
the interest of national defense, you are authorized by law to grant such
a price differential to new producers possessing the necessary qualifica-
tions as will enable them through efficient operations to fulfill their
contractual commitments at a price consisting of manufacturing costs,
normal depreciation and a reasonable profit. Statutory authority for
broadening the base of this three-producer industry so vital to the nation-
al defense is found in Sections 303(b) and 701 (b) of the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950, as amended."
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Defense Plants Administration, have been created to deal with
particular problems arising in the mobilization effort, appropriate
steps have been taken to render assistance to them by timely con-
sultation on their problems.
During this period in which the defense program is accelerat-
ing and the impact of the program on our economy is heightening,
consultations concerning the competitive effect of proposed defense
activities have increased both in frequency and in importance.
Industry Aduisory Committees
The Department of Justice has been vitally interested in the
activities of departments and agencies of the Government bearing
upon the creation and operation of business advisory committees.
The Defense Production Act, Sk 701 (b) (ii), provides that:
"Such business advisory committees shall be appointed as
shall be appropriate for purposes of consultation in the formula-
tion of rules, regulations, or orders, or amendments thereto
issued under authority of this Act, and in their formation there
shall be fair representation for independent small, for medium,
and for large business enterprises, for different geographical
areas, for trade association members and non-members, and for
different segments of the industry."
In order to minimize the possibility that participation in indus-
try advisory committees would result in violation of the antitrust
laws, the Department of Justice on October 19, 1950, formulated
and issued to the mobilization agencies the following minimum re-
quirements for the organization and operation of such committees :
(1) There must be statutory authority for the employment of
such committees or there must be an administrative find-
ing that it is necessary to utilize such committees to perform
certain statutory duties;
(2) The agenda for such committees and their meetings must
be initiated and formulated by the Government;
(3) The meetings to be held must be at the call of and under the
chairmanship of full-time government officials;
(4) Full and complete minutes of each meeting must be kept;
and
(5) The functions of such committees must be purely advisory
and any determinations of action to be taken must be made
solely by government representatives. 12
The mobilization agencies were informed in this letter that, so long
as the activities of industry advisory committees are carried on
within these limitations, the Department of Justice would not
12. Letter, dated October 19, 1950, signed by Peyton Ford, Deputy Att'y
General, to the mobilization agencies.
I[Vol. 36:490
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view the activities as constituting an independent violation of the
antitrust laws. The letter emphasized, however, that it should be
made clear to the participants in such activities that the Department
retains complete freedom to institute proceedings, either civil or
criminal, or both, in the event any particular plan or course of action
is used to accomplish unlawful private ends, and that the Depart-
ment retains full freedom to institute civil actions to enjoin con-
tinuance of any acts or practices found not to be in the public
interest and persisted in after notice to desist.
On March 15, 1951, the Department, in a letter to all defense
officials, called attention to the following improper practices in the
formation and operation of business advisory committees which a
number of private concerns had brought to the Department's atten-
tion:
(a) Committees have met without the benefit of a government
chairman;
(b) Government representatives have lacked proper qualifica-
tions;
(c) Agenda have been prepared and meetings have been called
by industry rather than by the department or agency con-
cerned;
(d) Subcommittees, panels and other subgroups have not ad-
hered to the requirements established for the full commit-
tees;
(e) The requirements with references to committee representa-
tion set forth in Sec. 701 (b) (ii) of the Defense Production
Act have not been met; and
(f) Many of the committees, rather than being advisory, have
in fact made decisions and exercised functions which prop-
erly should reside exclusively in government officials. 13
The mobilization agencies were requested in this letter to take steps
to insure that advisory committee procedures should comply with
the Department's criteria. Since that letter, many agencies have con-
sulted with the Antitrust Division for the purpose of promulgating
regulations which accord with these standards.
On September 13, 1951, the Department of Justice wrote a
letter 1 to all mobilization agencies listing eighteen improper prac-
tices in the creation and operation of industry advisory committees
which were disclosed in a series of hearings conducted by the House
judiciary Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power.' 5 In this
13. Letter, dated March 15, 1951, signed by H. G. Morison, Ass't Att'y
General, to the mobilization agencies.
14. Letter, dated September 13, 1951, signed by H. G. Morison, Ass't
Att'y General, to the mobilization agencies.
15. The hearings were those which resulted in issuance of the report,
The Mobilization Program. See note 1 supra.
19521
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letter, the Department recommended that, wherever such improper
practices occur, effective corrective steps be taken at once to insure
that the committees should function in accordance with the standards
established by the Department.
Business advisory committees, when properly conducted, per-
form a valuable function in advising and making recommendations
to Government officials. Unless the sfandards for their conduct are
scrupulously observed, however, the committees may become active
in matters foreign to their purpose and may engage in or cause others
to engage in practices detrimental to free competition.
Deviations from antitrust standards may well result in the loss
to the Government of the valuable services rendered by the commit-
tees since many business enterprises may refuse to participate in
committee activities by reason of the fear that they may become sub-
ject to penalties, including possible treble damage liability, for viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. For these reasons, the Antitrust Division
has taken, and will continue ':o take, appropriate steps to bring
about the elimination, as they are disclosed, of objectionable fea-
tures in the operations of industry committees.
Voluntary Agreements
Sections 402(a)"0 and 708(a)"1 of the Defense Production
Act of 1950 authorize Government officials to consult with business
and other groups with a view to encouraging the formulation of
voluntary cooperative agreements to further the objectives of the
Act. Subdivisions (b) and (c) of § 708 11 also provide that the ap-
16. Section 402(a) reads:
"In order to carry out the objectives of this title, the President may
encourage and promote voluntary action by business, agriculture, labor
and~consumers. In proceeding under this subsection the President may
exercise the authority to approve voluntary programs and agreements
conferred on him under section 708, and may utilize the services of per-
sons and agencies as provided in section 710."
17. Section 708 (a) provides:
"The President is authorized to consult with representatives of in-
dustry, business, financing, agriculture, labor, and other interests, with
a view to encouraging the making by such persons with the approval by
the President of voluntary agreements and programs to further the ob-
jectives of this Act."
18. Subdivision (b) and (c) of § 708 provide:
"(b) No act or omission to act pursuant to this Act which occurs
while this Act is in effect, if requested by the President pursuant to a
voluntary agreement or program approved under subsection (a) and
found by the President to be in the public interest as contributing to the
national defense shall be construed to be within the prohibitions of the
antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act of the United States.
A copy of each such request intended to be within the coverage of this
section, and any modification or withdrawal thereof, shall be furnished
[ Vol. 36:490
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propriate Government official shall consult with the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission concerning
any proposed voluntary agreement, and shall obtain the approval of
the Attorney General prior to requesting private groups to act or to
refrain from acting pursuant to any such agreement.' Acts or omis-
sions to act pursuant to a voluntary agreement, if requested by such
official and found to be in the public interest as contributing to the
national defense, shall not be construed to be within the prohibitions
of the antitrust laws.
It must be emphasized that, except to the extent of operations
of voluntary agreements under § 708, the antitrust laws remain in
full force and effect during the mobilization period. There has been
no repeal or suspension of the antitrust laws during this period. 20
If competitors take joint action which has not been requested in
connection with an agreement approved under § 708, even though
Government officials urge or give their tacit approval to such joint
action, they may find themselves violating the antitrust laws, and
therefore subject to their penalties. Congress has specified the pre-
to the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Federal Trade Com-
mission when made, and it shall be published in the Federal Register
unless publication thereof would, in the opinion of the President, endanger
the national security.
"(c The authority granted in subsection (b) shall be delegated only() to officials who shall for the purpose of such delegation be required to
he appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, unless otherwise required to be so appointed, and (2) upon the
condition that such officials consult with the Attorney General and with
the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission not less than ten days
before making any request or finding thereunder, and (3) upon the
condition that such officials obtain the approval of the Attorney General
to any request thereunder before making the request. For the purpose
of carrying out the objectives of title I of this Act, the authority granted
in subsection (b) of this section shall not be delegated except to a single
official of the Government."
19. Section 708 differs in this respect from comparable legislation en-
acted in World War II. Under the procedure established in § 12 of the Small
Business Act, Pub. L. No. 603, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1942), 56 Stat.
351, 357, voluntary cooperation by business units in compliance with a request
from the Chairman of the War Production Board was not subject to the
provisions of the antitrust laws if the Chairman had consulted with the Att'y
General and had certified to the Att'y General that such activity was requisite
to the prosecution of the war. Approval of the Att'y General to the proposed
activities, however, was not required.
20. During World War II Congress provided for the suspension of the
operation of any statute of limitations applicable to violations of antitrust
laws. 18 U. S. C. § 590a (1946). This provision was considered necessary to
protect the right of the Government to proceed in investigations and trials
involving the antitrust laws which, because they interferred with war pro-
duction, had been postponed pursuant to an agreement among the War, Navy
and Justice Departments, approved by the President on March 20, 1942. White
House Press Release, March 28, 1942.
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cise manner and method by which immunity is granted. None other
will suffice. 21 '
Defense production pools represent one type of voluntary co-
operative program which has been approved pursuant to the author-
ity contained in these sections of the Act.2 2 A production pool is an
association of small manufacturing firms organized for the purpose
of jointly obtaining and performing defense contracts. By combining
their capital and production facilities in a pool, small manufacturers
are able to participate in defense contracts from which they as in-
dividuals would be excluded. A pool can deal more effectively with
Government procurement officers and prime contractors than can
its members individually and can do so at less cost in time and effort.
Pools are advantageous to the Government in that they increase
capacity for defense production, accelerate defense production, de-
centralize production, and make it possible to utilize productive
capacity of small producers during a period of partial mobilization.
Production pools may be composed of manufacturers, who, in com-
bination, are able to perform all manufacturing processes including
packaging of the end product, or they may be composed of manu-
facturers of a single article who by joint action can produce a great-
er volume. At this time, six production pools have been approved
under the Act.2 3
Another type of voluntary cooperative agreement which has
been approved is represented by the integration committees utilized
by the Department of the Army. These integration committees are
formed pursuant to voluntary agreements which permit cooperative
action by manufacturers under contract with the Armed Forces to
produce essential military items such as tanks, rockets, artillery
shells and tactical trucks. As new companies are awarded defense
contracts for a particular item for which a committee has been ap-
proved, they become participants in the agreement covering that
item. The committees exchange technical information concerning
21. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 226 (1939).
22. For a discussion of the organization and operation of production
pools, see Defense Production Administration, Office of Public Information.
Pooling Production For Defense (pamphlet).
23. The names of the pools which have been approved and the citation
to the Federal Register in which published are:
(1) Omaha Industries, Inc., 16 Fed. Reg. 4475 (1951).
(2) Coordinated Manufacturers of Santa Clara, California, 16 Fed. Reg.
6544 (1951).
(3) Peoria Consolidated Mantfacturers, Inc., 16 Fed. Reg. 8851 (1951).
(4) Greater New York Manufacturers Pool, 16 Fed. Reg. 8851 (1951).
(5) Central California War Industries, Inc., 16 Fed. Reg. 10042 (1951).
(6) Illinois Manufacturers Defense Pool, Inc., 17 Fed. Reg. 1527 (1952).
[Vol. 36:490
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the production of the article covered by the agreement, interchange
supplies and equipment, and make recommendations to solve pro-
duction problems.
It has been found necessary to approve integration committees
in the interest of securing adequate production of essential military
items as quickly as possible. In approving agreements creating
integration committees, the Antitrust Division has insisted that
they be surrounded by every possible safeguard for the preserva-
tion of competition. Thus, these agreements provide that all Ultimate
decisions must be made solely by the Armed Forces, and that all
activities shall be carried out in the course of meetings in which the
Government has prepared the agenda, in which a Government official
presides and and in which full and complete minutes are kept.24
Other voluntary agreements which have been approved include:
(1) A plan by which the extension of bank credits may volun-
tarily be limited to those loans which are necessary to the
national defense or essential to the civilian economy. Under
this plan, if a banker is uncertain concerning the inflation-
ary effect of a proposed loan, he may come to a committee
which will advise him whether it considers the loan to be
an inflationary one. The banker is free to proceed as be
sees fit with reference to making the loan after the commit-
tee has advised him of its views.
25
(2) An agreement permitting companies engaged in foreign
petroleum operations to take action to offset the shortage
of crude oil and refined products resulting from interrupted
petroleum operations in Iran.20
24. Military items for which integration committees have been approved
and the citation to the Federal Register in which certain of the agreements
have been published, are:
(1) Optical fire control equipment, 16 Fed. Reg. 1965 (1951).(2) Light gun tanks and allied combat vehicles, 16 Fed. Reg. 9826
(1951).
(3) M-34 modification kit, 16 Fed. Reg. 10467 (1951).
(4) Tracks for track laying type vehicles, 16 Fed. Reg. 10791 (1951).
(5) Small arms ammunition, 16 Fed. Reg. 12203 (1951).
(6) 3.5 inch rocket, 17 Fed. Reg. 1527 (1952).
(7) Medium and heavy gun tanks and allied combat vehicles, 17 Fed.
Reg. 2022 (1952).(8) 4.2 inch mortar shell.(9) Artillery mechanical time fuses.
(10) M21 A4 booster.
(11) M-48 type fuses.
(12) Heavy tactical trucks, 17 Fed. Reg. 1910 (1952).
(13) Light and medium tactical trucks, 17 Fed. Reg. 2823 (1952).
(14) Steel cartridge cases.
(15) Conventional artillery and mortar shells.(16) Hydrogen thyratron tubes.
(17) Shell loading.
(18) .50 Caliber machine gun.
25. 16 Fed. Reg. 2372 (1951).
26. 16 Fed. Reg. 8375, 8377 (1951).
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(3) A plan to conserve newsprint in Boston by means of an
agreement whereby newspaper companies limit the number
of papers they will make available at newsstand outlets in
order to reduce the quantity of newsprint wasted in unsold
newspapers.27
(4) A plan by which the owners of ocean-going tankers con-
tribute on a pro-rata basis tanker capacity needed by the
Department of Defense..2
8
(5) Agreements designed to facilitate the exchange of technical
information concerning the production of B-47 bombers,"'
N-9 gun cameras"0 and J-47 jet engines3' among the par-
ticipants and generally to achieve close cooperation in the
solution of production problems.
In many factual situations, the mobilization agencies may accom-
plish their objectives either by the issuance of regulations or orders,
or through the formulation of voluntary agreements. In such cir-
cumstances, the Antitrust Division has recommended that serious
consideration be given to the former procedure since the regulation
or order frequently will afford a greater degree of protection to the
business enterprises concerned, and will eliminate the necessity for
agreements as to business practices between competitors.
When it has been determined that a voluntary agreement is to
be utilized, the Antitrust Division considers that the agreement
should be drawn in such a manner as to accomplish the specific ob-
jective required in the public interest as contributing to the national
defense and, at the same time, to insure that our competitive system
is impaired to the minimum extent possible. Exemptions from the
antitrust laws should be limited to the degree actually required by
the facts of the particular situation. This procedure conforms to the
expressed purpose of the Defense Production Act that our mobil-
ization program should be carried on, in so far as practicable,
within the framework of the American system of competitive enter-
prise.
It is the view of the Antitrust Division that agreements should
be so formulated as to contain procedural safeguards which will (a)
protect the business participants from unjustified charges concern-
ing activities carried on by them in the course of the program, and
(b) forestall the possibility of violations of the antitrust laws by
participation in activities which would not be within the exemption
of the approved agreement.
27. 16 Fed. Reg. 11314 (1951).
28. 16 Fed. Reg. 1964 (1951).
29. 16 Fed. Reg. 8852 (1951).
30. Approved by the Att'y General December 21, 1951.
31. Approved by the Att'y General December 17, 1951.
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The Division considers that the procedural standards set forth
in the letter from the Department of Justice to mobilization agencies,
dated October 19, 1950, should be adopted where appropriate, par-
ticularly those requirements providing for the initiation and formu-
lation of the agenda by the Government, for the holding of meetings
at the call of and under the chairmanship of full-time Government
officials and for the keeping of full and complete minutes. 33
Reports of the Attorney General
In § 708 (e) of the Defense Production Act, 33 Congress di-
rected the Attorney General to make, or to request the Federal
Trade Commission to make for him, surveys for the purpose of de-
ternining any factors which may tend to eliminate competition,
create or strengthen monopolies, injure small business or otherwise
promote undue concentration of economic power in the course of
the administration of the Act, and to report the results of such sur-
veys with such recommendations as he deemed desirable to the
Congress and to the President.
The first report,3 4 submitted December 7, 1950, pointed out the
dangers to competition which are inherent in the fields of Government
procurenment, Government research, expansion of production facili-
ties, allocations and priorities, price controls, fiscal controls, volun-
tary agreements and programs, and business advisory committees,
and also discussed policies which should be carried out to minimize
these dangers.
The second report,-3 submitted April 30, 1951, was based upon
a survey of Government procurement after the outbreak of hostili-
ties in Korea and recommended that a program of central procure-
ment planning be established and utilized. This program would
32. Procedures for the guidance of the agencies concerned with the
necessity for voluntary agreements, and the criteria and standards applicable
to such agreements, were outlined in a letter dated Dec. 18, 1951, signed by
H. G. Morison, Ass't Att'y General, to the mobilization agencies.
33. Section 708(e) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended,
reads :
"The Attorney General is directed to make, or request the Federal
Trade Commission to make for him, surveys for the purpose of deter-
mining any factors which may tend to eliminate competition, create or
strengthen monopolies, injure small business, or otherwise promote un-
due concentration of economic power in the course of the administration
of this Act. The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress and the
President within ninety days after the approval of this Act, and at such
times thereafter as he deems desirable, reports setting forth the results
of such surveys and including such recommendations as he may deem
desirable."
34. Dep't of Justice Press Release, Dec. 7, 1950.
35. Dep't of Justice Press Release, April 30, 1951.
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catalogue all our present and potential producers of military goods
and inventory the productive facilities of the nation. This report
pointed out that if our procurement efforts are guided by informed
planning, we will be able to spread military contracts in such a
manner that all segments of business will be able to participate, and
to take appropriate action to insure that those businesses not present-
ly engaged in defense production will continue undiminished in
strength until they are needed.
The third report, 36 submitted December 19, 1951, dealt with the
compelling urgency for integrating our vast military procurement
program into the nation's over-all economy in such a manner that
the objectives of mobilization may be accomplished with the least
impairment of the strength and soundness of the American system
of competitive enterprise. The subject of the report and its recom-
mendations were based upon a continuing survey of military pro-
curement procedures since the beginning of hostilities in Korea. The
report recommended that the re3ponsible military and civilian agen-
cies introduce into procurement for our Armed Forces the plan-
ning and scheduling which will insure that we obtain all of our mili-
tary requirements as we need them and at the same time preserve
the health of the competitive structure of the nation's economy. This
would eliminate such practices as unnecessarily heavy purchases for
delivery within short-term intervals, the use of critically short ma-
terials when adequate substitutes are available and similar usages
which inevitably flow from a procurement program lacking basic
planning.
The urgency that impels appropriate planning arises in great
part from the unique nature of our defense and preparedness pro-
gram. During the 1952 fiscal period it is expected that about 54 bil-
lion dollars will be available for military equipment and construction.
Military procurement is steadily increasing and present planning
does not contemplate that it will reach a maximum prior to some-
time in 1953. Purchases for defense requirements are presently at
the rate of approximately 4 billion dollars per month .3 7 When the
vast proportions and indeterminate duration of our military require-
ments are fully comprehended, it becomes clear that we must now
establish an informed and orderly program of procurement.
The very magnitude of our current military program and the
uncertainty of its duration or tempo warn us that our civilian econ-
36. Dep't of Justice Press Release, Dec. 19, 1951.
37. Director of Defense Mobilization, Three Keys to Strength 3 (Third
Quarterly Report to the President, Oct. 1, 1951).
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omy faces fundamental dislocations in production, distribution and
employment. Many of these dislocations can be prevented entirely
and the effects of others can be minimized if adequate programming
and scheduling of military requirements are undertaken now.
Conclusion
The strength of our nation and the security of the free peoples
of the world rest on the vast industrial machine which this nation
has developed. In peacetime, our industrial might provides us with
a standard of living unmatched by that of any other economy in the
world. In times of emergency, it serves as the arsenal of democracy.
One of the primary factors contributing to our industrial growth
has been the competitive spirit which is basic to our dynamic econ-
omy. It is, therefore, of fundamental importance that we insure the
continuation of this freedom to compete during our mobilization
effort. Only by its preservation will we be able to maintain the in-
dustrial strength guaranteeing our political and religious freedoms.
